Africa should not be the raw material battlefield of the new minerals race

• Critical minerals: The world’s appetite for cobalt, copper, lithium, graphite, manganese and rare earths is growing because the technologies that promise a cleaner and more digital future still depend on physical minerals, writes Prof. Yizhou He.
• While the U.S. is trying to reduce dependence on Chinese-dominated supply chains. China remains deeply embedded in mining, refining and battery manufacturing. Europe is searching for “secure” and “responsible” mineral partnerships.

In May 2026, another deal reminded the world why the Democratic Republic of Congo sits at the centre of the global energy transition. Congo’s state cobalt company, Entreprise Générale du Cobalt, Trafigura and the US company EVelution Energy signed a memorandum of understanding to build a long-term supply chain moving Congolese cobalt hydroxide to the United States, where it would be processed in Arizona into battery-grade cobalt sulphate or alloy-grade cobalt metal for electric vehicles, aerospace and defence industries. The deal could help EVelution meet up to 40% of projected US cobalt demand.[2]

 For Washington, this looks like supply-chain security. For Kinshasa, it looks like bargaining power. For Africa, however, it raises a bigger question: will the continent’s critical minerals finally become a foundation for industrial transformation, or will they simply become the next battlefield in a geopolitical contest fought over African soil?

Can African governments can turn foreign competition in critical minerals into local value?

 The answer will not be found in Washington, Beijing or Brussels. It will depend on whether African governments can turn foreign competition into local value.

The world’s appetite for cobalt, copper, lithium, graphite, manganese and rare earths is growing because the technologies that promise a cleaner and more digital future still depend on physical minerals. Electric vehicles, batteries, wind turbines, solar panels, data centres, drones and defence systems all need inputs that many African countries possess. The DRC alone accounts for more than 70% of global cobalt production and is also a major copper producer.[3] 

This should give African states leverage. Yet history gives reason for caution. Africa has seen many resource booms before. Oil, gold, diamonds and copper have too often generated enclaves rather than economies: mines connected to ports, contracts connected to elites, and export earnings disconnected from ordinary citizens. The critical minerals boom could repeat that pattern under a greener name.

 That is why the current moment matters. The United States is trying to reduce dependence on Chinese-dominated supply chains. China remains deeply embedded in mining, refining and battery manufacturing. Europe is searching for “secure” and “responsible” mineral partnerships. Gulf and Asian investors are also entering the race. This competition can be dangerous if it turns African countries into arenas of rivalry. But it can also be useful if African governments use it to demand better terms.

Read also: How DRC’s cobalt export ban is reshaping the US-China tech race

Cobalt and other critical minerals

 The DRC is beginning to test this possibility. In April 2026, it created a strategic reserve for cobalt and other critical minerals to influence supply and stabilise prices. This followed earlier export restrictions and quota measures introduced after cobalt prices fell sharply because of oversupply.[4] The same month, President Félix Tshisekedi ordered an audit of copper and cobalt export revenues and state mining assets, citing poor oversight, opaque joint ventures and revenue losses despite record production.[5]

 These are not technical details. They go to the heart of the minerals question. If African governments cannot track what leaves their borders, who earns from it, and how much revenue returns to the state, then no “strategic partnership” will deliver development. A country can dominate global cobalt production and still fail to convert that dominance into schools, roads, electricity, industrial jobs or stronger public finances.

 Security is another warning sign. In April 2026, Congo announced a plan to create a large mining guard to protect sites and mineral supply chains, with the government initially presenting the initiative as backed through strategic partnerships with the US and the UAE. The US embassy later said Washington was not funding units to patrol or guard mines. [6]Whatever the funding details, the episode shows how easily minerals, conflict and external interests can become entangled. 

This is particularly sensitive in eastern Congo, where armed groups, smuggling networks and regional tensions have long shaped the political economy of minerals. A minerals strategy that focuses only on securing mines for foreign buyers, without addressing local insecurity, labour rights, community benefits and governance, risks deepening the very instability it claims to solve.

 The problem is not that foreign companies want African minerals. The problem is that too many deals still treat Africa mainly as the upstream end of someone else’s industrial policy.

Read also: Inside the $9 billion U.S.-backed critical minerals deal in DRC and what it means for China

US-DRC cobalt supply agreement

 The recent US-DRC cobalt supply agreement is a useful example. According to the announced structure, Congolese cobalt hydroxide would be sourced in the DRC, handled through international logistics and then processed in Arizona into higher-value products for US industries. That may be commercially logical for the companies involved. But from an African development perspective, it leaves an uncomfortable question: why should the most valuable stages of processing, technology and industrial learning continue to happen elsewhere? 

African countries do not need to process every mineral fully at home tomorrow. Building refineries, battery precursor plants and manufacturing ecosystems requires electricity, infrastructure, skilled labour, finance, environmental regulation and stable policy. These are real constraints. But constraints should not become excuses for permanent dependency.

 The immediate goal should be practical and staged value addition. For cobalt and copper, that could mean more domestic refining, chemical processing, component production and supplier development. For lithium and graphite, it could mean moving beyond raw exports into processing and battery-material preparation. For manganese and rare earths, it could mean regional industrial planning rather than isolated national deals.

 This is where African regionalism matters. Few African countries can build full battery or clean-energy supply chains alone. But regional value chains are possible. The DRC and Zambia have already been discussed as potential partners in battery-related industrialisation because of their mineral endowments. Southern Africa has logistics corridors, mining experience and industrial capacity. East Africa has growing renewable energy ambitions and port access. North Africa has proximity to European markets. The African Continental Free Trade Area gives a political framework, but it still needs industrial content.

Read also: In Tanzania, a new chapter in value addition for critical minerals opens

Value addition in critical minerals

The African Union’s emerging focus on value addition in critical minerals is therefore important. In 2026, continental discussions on extractive industries took place against the backdrop of an accelerating global rush for minerals driven by the energy transition, digitalisation and geopolitical competition, while also warning about risks to human and peoples’ rights.[7] The challenge is to turn those principles into bargaining rules: no major mineral agreement should be judged only by investment value or export volume. It should also be judged by local processing, tax transparency, technology transfer, environmental standards, community benefit and African ownership of data about production and trade.

 This requires a change in how African governments negotiate. Too often, countries bargain separately and urgently, while investors bargain globally and patiently. Governments compete with each other by offering tax holidays, export permissions, cheap land or regulatory flexibility. Companies and external powers then play one jurisdiction against another. A more coordinated African approach would not eliminate competition, but it could raise the floor. There are three things African governments should ask of every critical minerals deal. 

First, where will value be added? A contract that exports raw or semi-processed material should include a credible pathway to more local processing over time. This does not have to be immediate or unrealistic, but it must be measurable.

Second, who will learn? Minerals deals should include training, supplier development, research cooperation and technical education. The most important transfer is not a ribbon-cutting ceremony but the accumulation of skills among African engineers, managers, regulators and firms.

Raw material battlefield: Transparency is power

 Third, who will know? Transparency is power. Governments need traceable export systems, public revenue reporting and stronger oversight of joint ventures. Citizens need to know whether the country is gaining from its minerals or merely watching trucks leave.

 This is not an anti-China, anti-US or anti-Europe argument. In fact, Africa benefits when external powers compete to invest. Chinese companies have built significant positions in African mining and processing. Western governments now want alternatives. Other investors are entering. The point is not to choose one patron. The point is to stop behaving like a price taker.

 The new minerals race gives Africa a rare moment of leverage. But leverage is not the same as development. If the continent only exports more cobalt, copper and lithium to satisfy other countries’ energy transitions, the green economy will reproduce an old extractive order. If, however, African governments use this moment to demand processing, transparency, skills and regional industrialisation, critical minerals could become more than another resource boom.

 The question is not whether the world needs Africa’s minerals. It clearly does. The question is whether Africa can make the world need African industry too.

Opinion by Yizhou He, Assistant Professor, Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University, China.

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